The shipping industry in the United States often involves the performance of complex maritime contracts. It is not uncommon for the parties to these contracts to engage in disputes when one of these contracts is breached by one of the contracting parties. When this happens, there are four primary methods for resolving these disputes: direct negotiation, litigation, arbitration, or mediation.
Introduction
The shipping industry in the United States often involves the performance of complex maritime contracts. It is not uncommon for the parties to these contracts to engage in disputes when one of these contracts is breached by one of the contracting parties. When this happens, there are four primary methods for resolving these disputes: direct negotiation, litigation, arbitration, or mediation.
Background
This article will first briefly examine the particulars of the primary methods for resolving maritime contract disputes. The article will then conclude by focusing on some of the pitfalls that parties should avoid when attempting to resolve a maritime contract dispute.
Having ascertained that Puerto Rico enjoys the same immunity accorded states, we next turn our attention to the types of entities to which a court will grant immunity. Court determined a school board was not immune in a contract dispute. In making the determination that the school board was more akin to a political subdivision (and therefore not entitled to immunity), the Court looked to several factors: the entity's designation under state law, the supervision of the state over the entity, funding received by the entity from the state, and whether the entity generated its own revenue. 29 The Court determined that the school board's status under state law as a municipal entity and ability to generate its own revenue outweighed the state's financial assistance and administrative control, factors that would have pointed toward the board being an arm. The Court focused on the "nature of the entity," its treatment by state law, and its closeness to the state's treasury, 30 but did not explain the weight it gave to the different factors it assessed.
31
Immediately after Mount Healthy, the Supreme Court again addressed the issue in Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency 32 ("Lake Country").
At issue was whether the agency, created by the compact, acted under federal authority (by virtue of the compact) or under color of state law when conducting land management functions. Due to its nature as a compact clause entity, the intent of the states in forming the agency, and the actual operation of the agency, the agency was not entitled to immunity. 33 Simpson-Wood suggests that the Court here 34 americanbar.org/tips offered more guidance than it did in Mount Healthy by providing a longer list of relevant factors, 34 including an analysis of the agency's organic statute, the power to appoint officials, the source of funding for the entity, whether the agency's financial obligations were binding on the state, which government (local or state) was involved in the entity's functions, and whether agency action was subject to state control or veto. 35 
III. PORT AUTHORITIES

A. Generally
In the U.S., port management is usually conducted by a port authority or other entity which may take the form of a governmental or quasi-governmental entity. 54 Such an entity is an instrumentality "established by enactment or grants of authority by the state legislature." 55 This can take place on the state, local, or municipal level.
Ports may also be governed by private corporation, but in the U.S., the line between a public entity and a private port management corporation is often blurred. 56 Two or more states with a mutual interest in port management may, with the consent of Congress, found an entity by interstate compact. 57 When a court must determine whether an entity qualifies for arm-of-the state immunity, it is usually in one of three settings described above, 58 and it is primarily special purpose corporations and government entities which courts find to be entitled to share state immunity.
59
According to Mary Brooks, while port management can be structured in a multitude of ways, ports fall within certain patterns which can help determine the type of entity in question. Certain functions, such as licensing and permitting, customs, port monitoring, and policy control, are considered typically "governmental." Other typical port functions, such as cargo handling, pilotage, line handling, marketing, and 36 americanbar.org/tips waste disposal, are not definitively proprietary or governmental. Especially within the U.S., where port management is "fragmented with a web of public and private organizations involved in management at national, regional, and local levels, each with differing priorities, requirements, and procedures," there is often significant overlap between the types of functions performed by a port management entity.
60
B. Puerto Rico Ports Authority
The Puerto Rico Ports Authority is a government-owned corporation organized under the Puerto Rico Department of Transportation. It is both a government entity and a corporation -a "body corporate and politic … constituting a public corporation and government instrumentality." 61 It is created as the "successor" entity of the Puerto Rico Transportation Authority, but has a "legal existence and personality separate and apart from those of the Government and any officials thereof."
62
The PRPA is structured to be a separate entity from the government of the Commonwealth, but still has close ties to Puerto Rico's government. The
Commonwealth is not bound by the actions of the PRPA, nor is it liable for PRPA's debts. 63 PRPA also has total autonomy when making decisions and has the power to sue and be sued. 64 These factors all indicate that PRPA is separate from the Commonwealth. The laws of Puerto Rico also create strong ties between the Commonwealth and the PRPA. The strongest indication of this is Puerto Rico's statutory assumption liability for certain actions arising when PRPA acts in its official governmental capacity. 65 And while PRPA exists as a corporation, it has no private owners and pays no taxes, and must submit yearly financial statements to the legislature and Governor for approval and is audited regularly by the Controller of Puerto Rico. 66 This indicates that while PRPA exists as an independent entity, the Commonwealth has a high degree of oversight over its actions. Further, while the Board of the PRPA is not a government entity, its officials have close ties with the Commonwealth, and the Governor of Puerto Rico has power over appointment and removal. 67 Finally, PRPA is governed by laws that apply to government agencies generally. 68 The functions of the PRPA include both private and public functions typical of port management entities, which is not uncommon for port authorities as described above.
The PRPA is in charge of the development, improvement, ownership, operation, and management of transportation in Puerto Rico, including mass marine transport. 69 PRPA also is charged with control of the waters of Puerto Rico, its ports, docks, and harbor zones, 70 and controls the regulation of pilot services, marine trade and navigation, and vessel inspection as well. 71 americanbar.org/tips
IV. IS THE PUERTO RICO PORTS AUTHORITY ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY
A. How Courts Have Previously Treated the PRPA
A court will grant port authorities Eleventh Amendment immunity if it determines the entity has sufficient ties to the state. Puerto Rico, while classified as a "Commonwealth" and a territory, is treated as a state for sovereign immunity. The First Circuit returned to the issue two years later in Royal Caribbean v. PRPA, a suit by the crew of the M/S Sovereign of the Seas for personal injury after a steel post on a pier broke. 79 The Court determined PRPA was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity because it failed to demonstrate the "specific activities which gave rise" to the suit were governmental in nature. This case used the Prince "type of activity" test, but determined that in this instance, the PRPA acted as a private entity and not as a state actor, and was therefore not entitled to sovereign immunity. 82 This entity, despite its "function as a government utility,"
was found not to be an arm of the Commonwealth as this was only one factor, which was outweighed by other factors weighing against the agency existing as an arm of the Commonwealth. 83 The Court further explained that when determining whether an entity is qualified for immunity, the "primary concern is to minimize federal courts' involvement in disbursal of state fisc."
84 The First In overturning the decision and determining that PRPA was entitled to arm-of-thestate immunity 91 , the Court applied a two-step test, looking at three factors under the first step. These factors are structural factors including "state intent, including the entity's functions; state control; and the entity's overall effect on the treasury." Circuit had focused on the "governmental-versus-proprietary functions" of an entity in general "as the test for assessing the sovereign immunity of a special purpose corporation," the First Circuit, according to the Court, had "expressly departed from that narrow focus." 99 Rather, after Fresenius, the First Circuit had shifted away from a "case-specific" analysis of the functions of an entity for examining structural indicators as a whole. 100 In light of Hess and, subsequently Fresenius, the functions of an entity, according to the First Circuit, are to be considered with other structural indicators in the first step of Hess. 101 The distinction between proprietary and government functions is no longer treated as dispositive, but the structural indicators as a whole are to be considered. Commonwealth does "exercise a meaningful degree of control and supervision over the PRPA." 103 The laws of the Commonwealth, according to the Court, characterize the PRPA as an "instrumentality of the Commonwealth," but also indicate it has a "legal existence and personality separate and apart" from the Government. 104 In assessing PRPA's function, the description of PRPA's function as "promoting the 'general welfare' and 'increas[ing] commerce and prosperity … for the people of Puerto Rico" was not sufficient to indicate that PRPA is an arm. 105 Rather, the functions of the PRPA include a "mix of functions of which some are characteristic of arms and others are not." 106 In analyzing the fiscal relationship between the PRPA and the Commonwealth, the Court concluded that the connection was not sufficient to establish PRPA as an arm. Despite a statutory commitment by the Commonwealth to pay PRPA's tort damages, the law still "reserves the 'wall' between PRPA's liability and the Commonwealth's fisc."
107
The Court found no clear answer under the first step of the test, as the factors pointed in different directions. The Court then moved on to the second step, which the Court addressed briefly, indicating that the "picture is quite clear" that PRPA's potential liability poses no risk to the Commonwealth's fisc. 108 The Court looked to the structure and design of the PRPA to determine that it is essentially an americanbar.org/tips independent financial entity from the Commonwealth for the purposes of liability.
109
The Court concluded that the PRPA had not "met its burden to show that it is an arm of the Commonwealth" under step two, and is therefore not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in the suit.
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V. AFTER GRAJALES: OUTSTANDING ISSUES FACING THE PRPA'S STATUS AS AN ARM OF THE COMMONWEALTH
The First Circuit's most recent conclusion regarding the status of PRPA has further complicated an already thorny area of law, leaving a circuit split between the D.C. In particular, courts addressing PRPA's status have failed to determine whether the functionality of PRPA is dispositive; that is, does the action performed by the PRPA (or any entity) giving rise to a cause of action in a particular case determine whether the entity is entitled to immunity? Using the function of an entity as a factor in determining whether it qualifies as an arm can be traced back to Hess 113 and is still used by many courts, 114 as demonstrated in Grajales. 115 However, the way this test is applied varies between circuits and, sometimes, even within the same circuit. Whether there is (or ought to be) a distinction between a general inquiry into 41 americanbar.org/tips the functions of an entity or a case specific one is unclear. In Grajlaes, the Court claimed to be following precedent in Fresenius in assessing the general functions of the PRPA rather than the specific ones giving rise to the suit. One particularly 
VI. CONCLUSION
The 
